c. The game can be repeated only a small number of times. b. Consider a “grim trigger” threat as part of a strategy: if there is a deviation from the prescribed production, go to producing q=11.2 forever after. a. NTS General Knowledge MCQs. NTS Sports MCQS Click Here. c. have no effect on the profits earned by individuals in these professions. NTS ENGLISH MCQs. In previous question does a promise to beat the price charged by another firm promote or inhibit competition? Both players have a dominant strategy. If the other player uses a grim trigger strategy, what is the total expected payoff from always cooperating? How about always defecting when 1 begins in a normal status? b. reduce profits earned by individuals in these professions. 4+4p+4p2+4p3+…;5+p+5p2+p3+… IS THE ANSWER. If 2 always cooperates, then 1 stays 'normal' and cooperates always as well, and the payoff to each player is 4 in each period. A firm adopts the pricing behavior of a dominant firm under the assumption that other firms will do likewise. c. A law that prohibits firms in an industry from advertising their services. Graphical Educational content for Mathematics, Science, Computer Science. Students preparing for ISC/CBSE/JEE examinations. If the other firm deviates to some price p with c < p < p, in the first period, and maintains this price subsequently, then it obtains, (p) in each subsequent period, so that its discounted average payoff is, is continuous). If there is any deviation then play (D, D) forever after. Countries aim to collude on production, drive up price and profits and return to equilibrium if someone deviates. (C, D) If player 1 adheres to tit-for-tat the outcome alternates between (D, C) and (C, D), so that her discounted average payoff is y/(1 + β). He devised a scale that measures how often an individual plays puzzle games such as Sudoku, and uses student GPA has a measure of academic achievement. Contents. If you are not sure about the answer then you can check the answer using Show Answer button. List of all ICSE and ISC Schools in India ( and abroad ). d. The payoff from a strategy depends on the choice made by the other player. d. Firms must be unable to detect the behavior of their competitors. ongoing trade, and so on. Profits are (160-20) 7 = 980 which is greater than one obtained by Nash Equilibrium. NTS Islamiyat MCQs. Repeated Games In the games considered so far the players took just a single decision: a strategy they selected. A firm whose price is not the lowest price receives no demand and produces no output. MCQ multiple choice questions and answers on Hockey Trivia Quiz. Using the payoff function of previous question find static nash equilibrium(where each country tries to maximise its profit) Assume there are 4 countries and c=20. Computer that requests the resources or data from other computer is called as _____ computer. 1919. b. Easier to sustain cooperation as probability continue increases, Sustain cooperation by threatening to resort to permanent defection if cooperation fails, If the threat is ``credible’’: it is an equilibrium, If there is a high enough weight on future interactions, then it is possible to sustain behaviours that were not possible in the short run. c. Market price results in neither a surplus nor a shortage. Thus we need x ≥ y/(1 + β), or β ≥ (y − x)/x, for a one-period deviation from tit-for-tat not to be profitable for player 1. However these Objective Questions on business law with solutions will help students of MBA, BBA, B.Com, M.Com. the critical value of ki found in previous question (That is,β, then no change in kj affects the outcome of the price-setting subgame, so j’s best action at the start of the game is θ, in which case i’s best action is the same. a. predicting the results of bets placed on games like roulette. A repository of tutorials and visualizations to help students learn Computer Science, Mathematics, Physics and Electrical Engineering basics. 40 Jobs MCQS in PDF File Click Here. I had to put as 70% pass rate because there may also be wrong answers from my side. the game that demonstrates the basic problem facing noncolluding oligopolists. Given any value of β for what values of. ) Basics of Economics MCQ with detailed explanation for interview, entrance and competitive exams. Thus we need δy/(1 + β) ≥ 1, or β ≥ 1/(y − 1), for a one-period deviation from tit-for-tat not to be profitable for player 1. Is it enforceable and feasible? They have constant average costs of $2 per unit. the set of all possible histories of length t. the set of all possible finite histories. ) More formally, imagine that I players playing a strategic form game G = I, (Ai) i∈I, (gi) i∈I for T periods (inﬁnitely-repeated game if T In previous question What is the threshold p* such that when p≥p* always cooperating by player 2 is a best response to player 1 playing tit for tat and starting in a normal status, but when p

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